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ABSTRACT 
The opportunity for nations such as Poland to enter NATO is of vital concern for 
their security. Indeed, the problem of inclusion into the Western alliance is the key issue 
for the majority of former Warsaw Pact members. After the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, 
these countries are no longer members of a security alliance. Yet, with the end of the 
Cold War, Poland confronts significant new security risks-- making the need to join an 
alliance such as NATO all the more important. The United States plays a key role in 
determining whether Poland will be invited into NATO. What will guide that decision? 
What lessons can be learned about U.S. decisionmaking from the creation of the 
Partnership for Peace, and what are the implications for possible Polish entrance into 
NATO? This thesis is based on interviews with U.S. policymakers on NATO expansion. 
The history of that policy, especially the creation of the Partnership for Peace as an 
alternative to immediate alliance expansion, offers a case study for drawing broader 
conclusions about the U.S. policymaking process. This thesis outlines that history, and 
argues that bureaucratic politics theories of U.S. policymaking are inadequate to explain 
the issue of NATO expansion. With the end of the Cold War, and scrambling of previous 
institutional interests within the U.S. government, those interests provide only limited 
help in accounting for the policymaking process that Jed to the Partnership for Peace. 
The fear of hostile Russian reaction to NATO expansion provides much of the rationale 
iii 
for U.S. opposition to inviting nations such as Poland into the alliance. However, 
significant disagreements persist over this issue, both within and between key U.S. 
poJicymaking organizations. The fragmentation of power in the U.S. decisionmaking 
process -- and the attendant need for compromise between actors -- also played a decisive 
role in the genesis of Partnership for Peace. This same multiplicity of interests and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The opportunity for nations such as Poland to enter NATO is of vital concern for 
their security. Indeed, the problem of inclusion into the Western alliance is the key issue 
for the majority of former Warsaw Pact members. After the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc, these countries are no longer members of a security alliance. Yet, with the end of 
the Cold War, Poland is confronting significant new security risks -- making the need to 
join an alliance such as NATO all the more important. The United States will play a key 
role in determining whether Poland will be invited into NATO. What will guide that US 
decision? What lessons can be learned about US decisionmaking from the creation of the 
Partnership for Peace, and what are the implications for possible Polish entrance into 
NATO? 
This thesis argues that existing bureaucratic politics theories of US foreign 
policymaking are inadequate to explain the issue of NATO expansion. With the end of 
the Cold War, and scrambling of previous institutional interests within tt.re US 
government, those interests provide only limited help in explaining the policymaking 
process that led to the Partnership for Peace. The fear of hostile Russian reaction to 
NATO expansion provides much of the rationale for US opposition to inviting nations 
such as Poland into the alliance. However, significant disagreements persist over this 
issue (both within and between key US policymaking actors), presenting Poland with the 
opportunity to press its case from a variety of useful perspectives. 
A. THE DILEMMA OF NATO EXPANSION 
NATO membership would reinforce Polish security and help Poland join in the 
progress toward a more united Europe. With a dynamically developing economy, almost 
entirely homogeneous population (ethnic Poles account for over 95 per cent of the total), 
and no border disputes with its neighbors, Poland would seem to be a reliable candidate 
for NATO membership. NATO membership might also reinforce the internal political 
evolution of Poland in a way that strengthens and solidifies its relationship with the West. 
However, Russian policy -- and the effect that it has on US decisionmaking -- has created 
3 serious problem for NATO expansion. In 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent a 
letter to the leaders of the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
opposing any expansion of NATO to include East-Central European countries. He 
emphasized that such a move would be considered by Moscow as a threat to Russian 
security concerns. Y eltsin argued: 
The main threat to Europe is now posed not by the East-West confrontation, but by 
inter-ethnic conflicts of a new generation. A quantitative increase of NATO will 
hardly resolve the task of countering them effectively. [ ... ) it is important to take 
into account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the 
opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of 
neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the 
Euro-Atlantic space.' (Emphasis added) 
Copy of the letter received during interview in the Pentagon. 
2 
This stand confronted United States policymakers with a stark dilemma: invite 
Poland to join NATO and risk alienating Russia, or accede to Russian sensitivities at the 
cost of Polish preferences (with all the broader security implications that such a move 
would have in East-Central Europe). 
Western countries have always been reluctant to expand their security alliance 
eastward; according to Adam Daniel Rotfeld, "they are guided by the illusory belief that 
the effective way of preserving the West's security is isolation and separation from 
perturbations and prob:ems in the Central-Eastern part of Europe. "2 However, this 
reluctance rests on a truism rather than truth. Leaving East-Central European countries in 
a peculiar "grey" zone will not necessarily serve Europe's security. On tht: contrary, such 
a status has historically encouraged eventual aggressors. From the Polish perspective, 
NATO membership offers Poland -- and the West as the whole -- the best possible basis 
on which to cement a post-Cold War peace. 
But things seem different from the perspective of many US policymakers. How 
valuable to US security would it be to " ... move the Berlin Wall a couple hundred 
kilometers eastward"3? Indeed, given the hostility that such a move might provoke in 
Moscow, and the way Russian extremists might attempt to capitalize on this hostility, 
some policymakers view NATO expansion as counterproductive to US interests.4 But 
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: 
"Partnership for Peace Or Appeasement?", The Warsaw Voice, January 16, 1994. 
1 General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaking on January 3, 
1994 to European journalists on the question of expanding NATO membership. 
4 This argument is very convenient for the Russian authorities, which have skillfully used it 
also in the context of Bosnia's conflict. Talking about a Zhirinovsky' s violent reaction for the NATO 
strikes against the Serbs, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, a foreign-policy expert and deputy in the Russian 
Parliament complained: "Why should the Americans play in the hands of Russian extremist forces 
3 
others -- including legislators such as Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) -- believe that the 
time has long since come to invite Poland to join the organization. 
How does the United States resolve such a policy dilemma? A considerable body 
of literature has emerged in political science on "bureaucratic politics:" in particular, on 
the role that institutional interests and bargaining relationships play in shaping policy 
outputs. Governments do not always behave in a "rational" way,_ they are often driven 
by partisan political concerns, domestic problems, or other considerations divorced from 
foreign policy priorities. Moreover, even when foreign policy considerations play a 
dominant role in decisionmaking, the structure and internal procedures of the US 
government can affect the po!icymaking process. But the f'ureaucratic politics school has 
also been criticized for paying too much attention to such institutional factors. Indeed, 
the purpose of this thesis is not only to examine the problem of US policymaking on 
NATO expansion, but also to test and evaluate the explanatory power of bureaucratic 
politics theories in this case. 
B. ORDER OF THESIS 
Chapter II outlines the theories of US foreign policy formulation that will be 
examined in the context of the NATO expansion issue. 
Chapter III offers an overview of the issue of NATO enlargement. It describes 
particular steps on the road of strengthening ties between the Western alliance and its 
former adversaries, countries which until 1991 were members of the Warsaw Pact. The 
like this?". See Newsweek, April 25, 1994: "Trial by Unfriendly Fire" {p.23). 
4 
chapter also discusses the significance of the Visegrad Triangle,5 German views on the 
issue of NATO expansion, and the evolution of Poland's viewpoint on joining the 
organization. 
Chapter IV examines the way in which the United States has dealt with the NATO 
enlargement issue. It analyzes the premises that have driven the US policy on NATO 
expansion, and examines how the Partnership for Peace initiative was created. Because 
this is the first account of PjP creation, the author relied primarily upon interviews he 
himself conducted. 
Chapter V discusses the conclusions of the study, and offers a prediction of how 
US policy toward NATO expansion is likely to evolve in the future. 
The regional cooperation between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary, started in 1990 
to coordinate their eventual "return to Europe". 
5 
II. THEORIES OF US FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION 
Political scientists have long argued over the relative importance of domestic and 
international influences on US foreign policy. In principle, US policy on issues such as 
NATO expansion ought to be highly sensitive to shifts in the European security 
environment and other international factors. In practice, many scholars in the 
bureaucratic politics school emphasize the role of domestic factors in shaping US foreign 
policy. From this bureaucratic politics perspective, the policy making process is affected 
by institutional interests, ethnic lobbyists and electoral concerns, and not just by events 
abroad. Indeed, international events may play a distinctly secondary role: 
Conventional analyses of foreign policy usually assume that the actions of other 
nations are the major stimuli for foreign policy decisions in the United States. We 
contend that they are only one source of stimulation, and not even the more 
frequent source. Most decisions are responses to domestic pressures, and the 
actions of other nations often figure merely as devices for argument. 6 
There is a general view in the United States that it is improper that domestic 
political considerations would influence foreign policy decisions, particularly these 
related to national security. Because of this, participants of policy making process 
frequently deny that they take domestic politics into account. However, proponents of the 
bureaucratic politics theory argue that "domestic political considerations and personal 
interests are an inescapable part of the decision process, especially at the White House 
" Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, 1974, 
pp.lOl/102. 
6 
level". 7 Moreover, domestic political considerations are especially likely to influence the 
decision process when large ethnic blocks of voters attempt to make their voices heard, in 
the White House but most especially in Congress. The existence of about 10 million US 
citizens of Polish descent suggests that on the issue of NATO expansion, domestic 
political concerns would be expected to play a highly significant role. 
Many students of US foreign policy also argue that the nature of foreign policy 
making process helps determine the content of American foreign policy. In particular, 
scholars of bureaucratic politics school, such as Morton H. Halperin, argue that 
institutional preferences play an essential role in US foreign policy formulation. 
According to this argument, the position that a person occupies in the bureaucracy often 
helps determine the position he takes on an issue. Put most bluntly, where a person 
stands on an issue depends on where he sits. The reason for this behavior is that a 
person's perception of a problem (and of possible solutions to it) reflects 
institutionally-grounded preferences and perspectives. According to Halperin, 
Each participant, depending on where he sits, will see a somewhat different face of 
an issue, because his perception of the issue will be heavily shaded by his particular 
concerns. What is primarily a budget issue to one participant will be an issue of 
relations with a foreign government to a second and of relations with Congress to a 
third.8 
Halperin argues that organizations involved in foreign policymaking process seek 
to have influence in order to pursue their specific missions. From this perspective, we 





the outcome of that issue -- in a very real sense -- will affect the ability of the Department 
to provide for US and allied security. However, in taking a position on a specific issue, 
organizations will also keep in mind the need to retain or expand their influence within 
the policymaking process. Who are the key participants in US decisions concerning 
NATO expansion? What policymaking roles do they play, and what are their bargaining 
relationships? 
A. PARTICIPANTS OF US FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESS 
There are four main actors responsible for US foreign policy formulation: the 
President with the National Security Council (NSC), the State Department, the 
Department of Defense, and Congress. However, the level of involvement in policy 
making process differs among these respective participants and significantly depends on a 
character of particular foreign policy matter. 
I. The President and the NSC 
The President, being the principal decision maker on important foreign policy 
issues, is surrounded by the supporting staff with which he consults: 
The president is, of course, constitutionally charged with conducting foreign policy, 
but he does not actually make it on most issues because he does not know enough 
and often does not much care. If an issue is not important enough, he leaves it to 
subordinates. 9 
., Richard Pipes, How Washington Makes Soviet Policy: Observations of a Visitor, Hoover 
Institution, Stanford University, 1990, p.6. 
8 
The National Security Council is the main advisory body to the President in 
national security issues related to foreign policy. Its actual significance is detennined by 
the President's interest in independently conducting foreign policy. If he prefers to rely 
on the Secretary of State (or other State Department official), the position of the NSC in 
US foreign policymaking process is less influential. However, even when the NSC does 
not take the lead on a given issue, it can still have an important effect in tenns of 
coordinating the interagency process by which other actors (including the Departments of 
State and Defense) attempt to shape policy. 
The role of the NSC in driving Clinton Administration policy on NATO 
expansion seems to be rather limited. In September 1993, National Security Adviser 
Anthony Lake took a public role in explaining issues concerning "democratic 
enlargement." Lake argued that the United States needed to enlarge the area of democracy 
abroad to replace the policy of "containing" communism. In this context, Lake made it 
clear that the Administration would resist "isolationist" temptations. 10 However, Lake did 
not discuss whether NATO expansion should be an integral part of that enlargement 
policy. Has the NSC played a more significant role behind the scenes, perhaps through 
the interagency process? Does the NSC have an institutional interests in the sense 
understood by the bureaucratic politics school? To what extent does the larger doctrine 
of enlargement drive the more specific policies on NATO expansion? 
111 See CRS Report for Congress: "Global Burdensharing in the Post-Cold World" by Stanley R. 
Sloan, October 8, 1993, p.16. 
9 
2. The State Department 
The Department of State has played a decisive role in the NATO expansion 
issue within the Clinton Administration. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, 
former Ambassador at Large to the countries that once formed the Soviet Union, is one of 
President Clinton's most trusted foreign policy advisers. Talbott has taken the lead in 
dealing with the interest of Poland and other former Warsaw Pact nations to join NATO, 
and played a key role in devising the Partnership for Peace. Talbott has been especially 
sensitive to the opposition of President Yeltsin to expanding NATO. Indeed, some critics 
have dubbed this policy the "Yeltsin-only" approach. 11 However, important questions 
remain about Talbott's role and policy preferences. To what extent are his views 
consistent with (and perhaps driven by) the institutional interests of the State 
Department? Or, in contrast to bureaucratic theories of foreign policy, do such 
institutionally-derived preferences play a relatively small role in this case? What role did 
the Department of State play in the creation of the Partnership for Peace? And finally, 
what does that role suggest for the prospects for NATO expansion in the future? 
3. The Department of Defense 
The Defense Department is responsible for more than operating and maintaining 
US military forces; it also can contribute to the formulation of US foreign policy, 
especially in issues concerning security organizations such as NATO. Depending on the 
preferences of the President, the Secretary of Defense may play a leading role in foreign 
" See The New York Times, December 29, 1993: "At State Dept., Upbeat' Friend of Bill'" by 
Elaine Sciolino. 
10 
policy formulation as it involves security issues. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (and, on occasion, the armed services themselves) may also contribute to US 
decisionmaking on NATO and other organizations. According to Halperin, 
Law and custom dictate that the Cabinet officers involved in foreign policy issues 
will almost always include both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense ... [ ... ) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are consulted particularly on military 
budget issues and matters concerning the possible use of force. 12 
The Department of Defense has special interests at stake in the issue of NATO 
expansion. Some analysts argue that because of the practical problems involved in 
incorporating former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO, including the issues of equipment 
compatibility, command and control integration, and related difficulties, the Pentagon 
should be expected to have institutional reluctance to expand the alliance. 13 But with the 
continued political turmoil in the former Soviet Union, how has the Department's view 
evolved of the relative costs and benefits of NATO expansion? Moreover, within the 
Pentagon, significant differences of opinion often emerge between the Joint Chiefs, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other decisionmaking participaatts. How have 
these disagreements played out in terms of NATO expansion? 
4. Congress 
Under the US Constitution, Congress has some powerful forces of leverage over 
foreign policy. Although the President has some unique authorities, including the power 
I! Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, 1974, 
p.18. 




to negotiate treaties, Congress retains an array of formal and informal powers that can 
make it an important player on issues such as NATO expansion. According to Halperin, 
Some congressmen and senators are senior participants in the sense that they are 
routinely contacted by the President for advice and support. These legislators are 
most often chairmen of high-ranking members of the congressional committees 
with direct responsibility for national security affairs (e.g. Armed Forces, Foreign 
Relations, Appropriations, Atomic Energy), and they have discretionary power over 
the federal budget. 14 
The latter power -- that of the purse-- is the most potent source of Congressional 
influence over foreign affairs. However, Congress can also influence policy in other 
ways, by generating anticipated reactions in the executive branch; through procedural 
innovations (i.e., legislative changes in the way foreign policy is made and executed); and 
by .framing opinion, i.e. changing the climate of opinion surrounding the foreign policy 
decision. 1 s 
However, while Congress has great potential power over issues such as NATO 
expansion, the question remains as to whether Congress will decide to use that power. 
Why would members of Congress care enough about this issue to spend time on it? One 
possibility is that in congressional districts with large numbers of voters of Polish 
ancestry, legislators might seek to gain votes by pressing to invite Poland to join NATO. 
Hughes and other political scientists emphasize the role that such re-election oriented 
concerns can play in motivating congressional behavior on forei311 policy, and that 
14 Ibid, p.19. 
''· See "How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy" by James M. lindsay and 
Randall B. Ripley in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill, University of 
Michigan Press, 1993. 
12 
Congress is more susceptible to ethnic pressure groups than the executive branch. I<> But 
how significant a role has Congress actually played in NATO expansion? To what extent 
have voters of Polish descent been able to pressure legislators into pushing for NATO to 
include Poland? 
B. CREATING A DECISION 
One of the key features of the American policymaking process is that no single 
actor can dictate policy on most issues; power and authority is widely shared, and 
numerous organizations have the opportunity to claim a decisionmaking role. Hence, 
organizations must bargain with each other in order to "cut a deal" that most closely 
corresponds to their own preferences. 
[ ... ] perhaps the most active game in Washington is seeking to determine who has 
influence with the President on what issues. 17 
Since the President has the most dominant voice on foreign policy issues, the main 
challenge for participants of policymaking process is to get an issue to the President and 
to convince him to decide in one's favor. Although the majority of issues is recommended 
to the President by the National Security Council staff, there are few personalities within 
the Administration who have the direct access to the President. Indeed, a personal 
relationship with the President is the single most important determinant of the influence 
'" Some observers of the American foreign policy arena argue that President Clinton has been 
ambiguous on the NATO question, partly because Poland still insists on joining and has a potential 
political lobby in the United States. See The Washington Post, November 18, 1993: "Ghost of Yalta" 
by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. 




of any senior official. In reality, such personalities often play a decisive role m US 
foreign policy fonnulation: 
Presidents typically confront an issue on a very general and theoretical level 
without much discussion of the details of the best way to implement a decision. 
When he has not spent time on details and has not looked into the possible 
problems buried in one kind of decision or another, the President prefers to express 
only a general desire to move in a particular direction and leave it to a battle 
among his subordinates to fill out the details. 18 (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, the power of the President's principal advisers is derived from the fact 
that these personalities, unlike members of Congress, do not have to take their prospects 
for reelection into account in arriving at a stand. Such privileged position ensures them a 
considerable independence in dealing even with controversial foreign policy issues. 
However, the nature of the bargaining process on NATO expansion offers an interesting 
case study in executive decisionmaking. In particular, how did the battle between Clinton 
subordinates result in the Partnership for Peace? 
A second bureaucratic politics issue exists on topics such as NATO expansion: the 
need to innovate. In contrast to the Cold War era, where decisions could often be guided 
by an underlying agreement on the need to contain communism, bureaucracies in the 
post-Cold War era face the need to develop new policies with few clear-cut 
underpinnings. This runs counter to the nature of bureaucracies. According to 
proponents of the bureaucratic politics theory, the most characteristic feature of 
bureaucratic system is its attachment to "eternal" procedures: 
IH Ibid, p.236. 
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The bureaucratic system is basically inert; it moves only when pushed hard and 
persistently. The majority of bureaucrats prefer to maintain the status quo, and only 
small group is, at any one time, advocating change. 1l) 
However, bureaucratic politics theory suggests some premises that can potentially 
lead participants of policy making process to seek a new strategy: 
• Dramatic changes in the actions of other nations; 
• Changes in technology (emergence of a new technology); 
• Changes in the shared images of the society or bureaucracy; 
(Since the society is apparently more susceptible to changes in shared opinion, 
these changes can drive the bureaucracy to adjust its hitherto policy to new requirements. 
However, sometimes the changing domestic mood can serve to consolidate conservative 
bureaucratic stands on particular foreign policy issues.) 
• Routine events; 
(A number of routine events require the American government, or in some cases the 
President personally, to state in public or to foreign governments a definite position 
on a particular issue. Such routine events provide at least an opportunity for 
participants to get an issue to the President and to press for a new decision. 20) 
How did the issue of NATO expansion get onto the front burner? According to a 
senior Administration official, the State Department became seriously interested in 
NATO enlargement issue only in the initial phase of its "bureaucratic cycle" preparing 
NATO summit. However, the way different organizations responded to the need for 




Ibid, p.l 03. 
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III. EXPANDING NATO: A KEY POLICY DILEMMA 
A. IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE 
Immediately after fundamental democratic transformations began in East-Central 
Europe/1 the countries of that region started to seek expanded relations with the West. 
Initially, their main goal was closer cooperation with the European Community (EC). 
Then, driven by their national security concerns, East-Central European countries began 
to flirt with NATO. This interest in NATO was driven by the perception that a security 
vacuum existed in the region: after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, East-Central 
Europe became a kind of "no-man's land". Considering this potentially dangerous 
situation, East-Central European countries sought to reorient their foreign policies toward 
the Weste!11 alliance. After tlte two-stage demise of the Warsaw Pact in spring 1991 
(military structure) and summer 1991 (political structure), joining NATO became a key 
issue for the majority of countries in the region. They have since tried to win not only 
declarative but also real security guarantees from the Western alliance. 
NATO, however, has been reluctant to provide any concrete security guarantees. 
NATO's standpoint has been summarized by Lord Carrington, NATO's former Secretary 
General: 
1
' The notion "East-Central Europe" is being used as a kind of compromise between two 
options: "Eastern Europe", prevailing in Western bibliography, and "Central Europe", generally 
preferred by countries of the region. The succession (first East, then Central) results from my personal 
conviction that a geographical location is, in this particular case, a secondary factor in comparison 
with a historical legacy of the respective countries. 
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First, this would lead to considerable disquiet by the Russians ... Second, a number 
of existing NATO members would not be very happy !o guarantee the so-called 
integrity of Poland and some of the other countries.22 (Emphasis added) 
This chapter gives an historical overview of the issue of NATO enlargement up till 
the announcement of the United States Partnership for Peace initiative. It describes the 
steps on the road of gradual strengthening relations between East-Central European 
countries and NATO. It also discusses the main role played in this process by the 
Visegrad Triangle's countries; other countries of the region, such as Bulgaria and 
Romania, have always been prudently behind Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. 
The chapter presents also an evolution of the Polish standpoint on NATO enlargement. 
B. INITIAL CONTACTS 
The first political contact between NATO and East-Central European countries took 
place in 1988, when a delegation ofthe North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), the consultative 
parliamentary body of the alliance, visited Hungary. Next year in May, a similar 
delegation paid a visit to Poland. These two visits bore fr..Jit in October 1989, when the 
NAA subcommittee on Eastern Europe organized a meeting between the assembly and 
legislators from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. By December 1989, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels 
symbolically marked the end ofthe Cold War. 
Profiting from that favorable political climate, East-Central European countries 
became more active in their efforts to expand relations with Western Europe. Initially, 
Radek Sikorski, "The New Shape of Europe". National Review, 27 December 1993. 
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Hungary took the lead in this process. As the first from the Warsaw Pact countries, 
Hungary raised the question of neutrality and emphasized a need for the reform of the 
Pact. The proposed refonn was aimed at changing the nature of the Warsaw Pact, from 
the military to the political aspects. 
At the beginning of 1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Hom officially 
mentioned a possibility for his country to seek NATO membership. In June 1990, during 
a meeting held in Copenhagen with US Secretary of State James Baker and West Gennan 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze 
announced that the Warsaw Pact would soon propose a new relationship between the two 
alliances. 23 
One month later, NATO responded favorably to the Sovtet initiative. In the 
declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the summit 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5-6 July 1990, the Western alliance 
offered a twenty-three-point peace package to the Warsaw Pact countries. The fourth 
paragraph of that declaration described a new NATO policy toward its adversaries: 
We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably 
linked to the security of its neighbors. NATO must become an institution where 
Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common 
defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic 
Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries 
in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand offriendship.24 (Emphasis added) 
11 Margaret Garrard Warner, "An Opening to the East?", Newsweek, 18 June 1990. 
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"London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance", NATO Review, No.4 
(August) 1990, p.32. 
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Representatives of the six members of the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet Union, 
Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) were invited not only to visit 
the Brussels headquarters, but also to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO. 
Despite a distrustful reaction of the top Soviet military leadership, the three 
East-Central European countries, encouraged by Shevardnadze, soon took advantage of 
the opportunity. In July 1990, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall came to NATO 
headquarters, and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner visited Czecho-Slovakia 
and Poland (September), and then paid a revisit to Hungary (November). 
The next significant step on the road to strengthening relations between the former 
adversaries was the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), which took place in Paris, on 19-21 November 1990. At the beginning of 
the summit, leaders of the seventeen NATO and the five Warsaw Pact states (without 
Romania) signed a joint declaration that finally confirmed a qualitatively new character 
of relations between the two alliances: 
The signatories solemnly declare that, in the new era of European relations which is 
beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend 
to each other the hand of friendship. 2s (Emphasis added) 
Another fundamental result of the summit was the conclusion by all thirty four 
CSCE countries of a Charter of Paris for a New Europe (known also as the Charter for a 
United Europe), described as "a landmark in European history, giving a new impetus to 
the spread of democracy, freedom and unity across the continent" .26 
,,, 
"Joint Declaration ofTwenty-two States", NATO Review, No.6 (December) 1990, p.26. 
"North Atlantic Council Ministerial Communique", ibid, p.22. 
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C. THEDEMISEOFTHEWARSAWPACT 
During the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee on 6 
June 1990, Hungarian Prime minister Jozsef Antall announced his country's intention to 
withdraw from the military structure of the alliance by the end of 1991. He also suggested 
that the obsolete security system should be replaced by negotiated bilateral security 
treaties with pact members as well as other European countries. Indeed, the remoteness of 
military conflict in Europe and the breakup of old ideological divisions made 
membership in the Warsaw Pact a formality. 
A few months earlier, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary signed (in February and 
March 1990, respectively) bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union, concerning a 
withdrawal of all Soviet troops from these countries by the end of June 1991. Poland, 
because of its critical importance to the Soviet position in East-Central Europe (especially 
in the context of German reunification) could not move so rapidly. Poland began to 
negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory only by the end of 1991 , just 
after a border treaty with Germany had been signed. 
Initially, Western countries resisted the idea of quick dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact. They feared it would cause a potentially dangerous imbalance of a previously stable 
regional system. Instead, the West advocated the reform of the Eastern alliance, rather 
than its dissolution. However, because Poland, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia demanded 
the Warsaw Pact's termination, the destruction of that alliance was inevitable. 
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The final decision was taken on 25 February 1991 in Budapest, during a meeting of 
the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The six remaining 
members (of the original eight) agreed to dissolve the Pact's military structure on I April. 
The symbolic signing on 1 July of the protocol on the dissolution in Prague--the city that 
was stricken in I 968 by the hand of the Warsaw Pact--cut the last of the political ties 
among countries in the Soviet postwar orbit. By the end of June 1991, the Soviet-led 
trade bloc, COMECON, also stopped functioning. 
D. THE VISEGRAD TRIANGLE 
The triangular cooperation between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary has 
played a significant role in their efforts to broaden relations with West European 
organizations. The first mention of the possibility of creating such a regional group was 
made by Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in September 1989, when he 
announced Poland's interest in expanding and strengthening ties with Prague and 
Budapest. There have been two main premises that justified the idea of trilateral 
cooperation: common interests and common realities. The three East-Central European 
countries, being at a similar level of development, have also faced similar problems. They 
have pursued the same objectives: membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. 
An additional factor favorable to cooperation has been a sense of sympathy and shared 
values and goals among Polish, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian democratic opposition 
figures (e.g Walesa, Havel, Antall, respectively), who assumed power after 1988. 
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The first practical step to strengthen relations among the three countries was a 
"summit" held in March 1990 in Bratislava, at the initiative of Czechoslovak President 
Vaclav Havel. During this inaugural trilateral consultation, the sides agreed to coordinate 
their moves to dismantle both the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). In order to ease the rising Soviet mistrust of 
this cooperative initiative, the participants of the Bratislava meeting argued that the 
dismantled Warsaw Pact would not be replaced by a new military bloc of the three states. 
Military ties between the respective countries were to rely mainly on separate bilateral 
agreements. 
Such defence agreements were signed in January 1991 by Czecho-Slovakia and 
Hungary, and then by Poland with Czecho-Slovakia (February 1991) and with Hungary 
(March 1991 ). These agreements stemmed from the meeting of deputy defence ministers 
from the three countries held in September 1990 in Zakopane, Poland. The main purpose 
of the agreements was to help restructure the respective anned forces in such areas as 
infonnation, organization and training, military exercises, and cooperation between anns 
industries. 27 
On 15 February 1991, the Presidents of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia and the Prime 
Minister of Hungary met in Visegrad, not far from Budapest. The selected place of 
meeting was symbolic -- in 1335 the kings of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary met in 
Visegrad to discuss cooperation among their kingdoms. Indeed, the summit meeting of 
n See Report on Eastern Europe, No.45, 5 November 1991: "New Bilateral Agreements" by 
Alfred A. Reisch. · 
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1991 can be considered as an attempt of "renaissance of ancient, long-forgotten political 
ties at the roots of which are the real geographical and historical properties and the 
specifics of various regions in Europe" .2K According to the intentions of the Visegrad 
meeting's participants, the "triangle" was supposed to facilitate a more direct association 
of their respective countries with Western Europe. The initial and positive measures 
pursued under its auspices included: 
• Consultations on matters pertaining to access to the European Community; 
• Consultations on the subject of relations with NATO; 
• Elaboration of an agreed and negative stand in respect of Soviet demands to 
incorporate the above mentioned "anti-alliance clause" in bilateral treaties.29 
The states of the Visegrad Triangle emphasized its exclusively consultative 
character, a kind of "loose political club". 
The main concern of the second Visegrad Triangle summit, which took place in 
Cracow on 6 October 1991, was the security situation in East-Central Europe. The three 
states' leaders, concerned by the recent attempt of military coup in Moscow (August 
1991 ), issued a joint declaration expressing their intention to establish close and 
institutionalized cooperation with NAT0.30 The response from the Western alliance was 
quick and favorable. Only lO weeks later, on 20 December 1991, NATO established the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for consultations with 
111 Janusz Prystrom, "The Military-Strategic Emancipation of Poland", Peace Research Institute 
Frankfurt Reports, No.25, January 1992, p.l 0. 
1
'' Ibid, p.11 . 
m The idea of "institutionalized cooperation" with the Atlantic Alliance by means of an 
international agreement was suggested by US Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign 
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the US-German proposal of 2 October 1991. 
23 
governments from East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union, including also the three 
newly independent Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
Throughout 1992, regular military consultations and meetings of defence ministers 
as weiJ as military chiefs of staff of the Visegrad Triangle were held. The aggregation of 
these three nations involved a significant military force. At the beginning of 1993, just 
after the split of Czecho-Slovakia, the four armed forces constituted quantitatively 
(manpower) in comparison approximately 40 percent of Russia's and 20 percent of 
NATO's conventional forces: 31 
Manpower Tanks Combat Aircraft 
NATO 2,667,000 23,400 4,901 
Russia 1,298,000 8,767 4,387 
Poland 273,000 2,807 508 
Czech Republic 110,000 1,703 231 
Hungary 76,000 1,331 143 
Slovakia 55,000 851 116 
The split of Czecho-Slovakia can be considered as "the beginning of the end" of the 
Visegrad Triangle. Throughout 1993, the Czech Republic seemed to gradually lose its 
interest in closer military relations with its former partners from the Warsaw Pact. Czech 
leaders began to emphasize that each of the Visegrad countries should separately seek 
possible membership in NATO. 
'' See The Economist, 25 December 1993- 7 January 1994: "The world sends NATO back to 
the drawing board". 
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E. STRENGTHENING TIES WITH NATO 
The dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact gave a new impetus for East-Central European 
countries to expand their relations with NATO. The first example was President Vaclav 
Havel's visit to NATO headquarters on 21 March 1991, which coincided with the end of 
the Warsaw Pact's military structure. In his address to the NATO Council, President 
Havel presented the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic viewpoint on future membership 
in the Western alliance: 
We realize that, for a number of different reasons, our country cannot become a 
regular member of the NATO for the time being. At the same time, however, we 
believe that an alHance of countries united by the ideals of freedom and democracy 
should not be forever closed to neighbouring countries that are pursuing the same 
goals.32 
Just after the final self-liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, on 3 July 1991, President 
Lech Walesa of Poland became the second East-Central European state leader to visit 
Brussels headquarters. He also emphasized his country's vital interest in a closer 
cooperation with NATO, but used the notion of "partnership": "What we want is a 
partnership with the Alliance and we assume that working together will be further 
continued and developed". 33 
The NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner responded to the above pleas 
politely but did not agree to them. NATO, engaged in the Gulf War and trying not to 
•J "President Havel visits NATO", NATO Review, No.2 (April) 1991, p.34. On Havel' s visit 
see also Washington Post, 22 March 1991: "Havel Urges NATO to Seek Ties With East's New 
Democracies" by William Drozdiak. 
" "President Walesa visits NATO headquarters", NATO Review, No.4 (August) 1991, p.34. On 
Walesa' s visit see also Rzeczpospolita, 4 July 1991. 
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antagonize the Soviet Union, was reluctant to clearly declare its position. In the 
meantime, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Ministerial Session in 
Copenhagen on 6-7 June 1991, issued a statement called the "Partnership With the 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe". In this document, NAC furthered the process 
of strengthening ties with its former adversaries by agreeing to use NATO to intensify 
military contacts with the East. 
The abortive August 1991 military coup in Moscow prompted the United States 
and Germany to urge their allies to take off the peculiar "anathema" placed heavily, so 
far, on NATO's possible involvement in East-Central Europe.~4 This idea was accepted 
during the NATO Rome Summit on 7-8 November 1991. According to the Secretary 
General Woerner: "One of the principal achievements of the Rome Summit was to raise 
the liaison relationship to a new qualitative level in recognition of the democratic 
progress made by the nations of Central and Eastern Europe".35 This aim was to be 
reached by the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (December). 
NATO foreign and defence ministers decided to meet twice a year with their counterparts 
from East European countries and the newly independent states of the former Soviet 
Union. 
By the end of the same year, Russian President Boris Y e1tsin told a newly 
established North Atlantic Cooperation Council that Russia might consider requesting 
'~ See Washington Post, 4 October 1991, "NATO Seeks New Identity in Europe" by William 
Drozdiak. 
'' Manfred Woerner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit", NATO 
Review, No.6 (December) 1991, pp.4/5. 
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membership in NAT0.'6 Yeltsin regarded Russia's possible membership in the Western 
alliance as a "long-term political aim" designed to help create an international security 
system stretching around the world "from Vancouver to Vladivostok":H 
It is not a question of five or six years but significantly more when there are no 
nuclear weapons. By that time, the weapons will have been destroyed, and 
integration will have been completed not just in Europe but beyond its borders. ' 8 
1992 brought a gradual shift from dialogue to the creation of more concrete 
political and military cooperation between NATO and its "consultative partners" from 
East-Central Europe. During the Warsaw conference held in March, Secretary General 
Woerner and Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, the head of NATO's Military Command, 
met with representatives of the Visegrad Triangle countries. Both sides emphasized a 
dynamic character of bilateral relations and discussed their further development, 
especially in the aspect of military exchanges. NATO declared to expand its assistance in 
training officers from East European countries in Western military academies and schools 
(a process that had already been started in 1990). However, the question of an eventual 
NATO membership for the three Visegrad countries was not addressed. 
'" See The Christian Science Monitor, 22 September 1993: "As East Bloc Drifts West, Russia 
Frets Over Security" by Daniel Sneider. 
'
7 David Remnick, "Russia Appeals for Membership in NATO", Washington Post, 21 
December 1991 . 
IK Ibid. 
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F. TIME OF EXPECTATION 
Throughout the rest of 1992, in the face of intensifying armed conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, the question of NATO enlargement became a secondary issue for most 
NATO powers. However, the interest of fonner Warsaw Pact members in joining NATO 
persisted. In December 1992, Albanian President Sali Berisha unexpectedly made the 
first formal request by an East European leader for membership in NATO. His request, 
submitted during visit to Brussels headquarters, was politely turned down. 39 
Other former Warsaw Pact members stepped up their efforts to secure NATO 
membership in the beginning of 1993. The West, however, remained reluctant to revise 
its basic policy of expanding neither fonnal security guarantees nor a membership of its 
alliance. On 29 March 1993 in Brussels, defence ministers and representatives from East 
European countries met with their NATO's counterparts to "review the progress made in 
dialogue, co-operation and partnership in defence-related matters" .40 
However, a decisive chain of events began in August 1993. During his first visit to 
Poland, Russian President Boris Y eltsin seemed to approve Polish attempts to join the 
Western alliance. The Russian-Polish joint declaration signed at the end of the visit 
stated: 
The presidents touched on the matter of Poland's intention to join NATO. President 
L. Walesa set forth Poland's well-known position on this issue, which met with 
understanding from President B. N. Yeltsin. In the long term, such a decision taken 
by a sovereign Poland in the interests of overaJJ European integration does not go 
''' See RFEIRL Research Report, Vol.2, No.28, 9 Jul·y 1993: "Central and Eastern Europe' s 
Quest for NATO Membership" by Alfred A. Reisch. 
4
" "Statement issued at the meeting of Defence Ministers at NATO headquarters, Brussels, 29 
March 1993", NATO Review, No.2 (April) 1993, p.34. 
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against the interest of other states, including the interest of Russia.41 (Emphasis 
added) 
Only one month later, just before he dissolved Parliament, President Yeltsin made a 
U-tum on his policies toward East-Central Europe. Reportedly under pressure from his 
armed forces, Russian President sent a letter to the leaders of the United States, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom opposing any expansion of NATO to include 
East-Central European countries. He emphasized that such a move would be considered 
in Moscow as a threat to Russia's security concems.42 The tone of the letter was not 
threatening, but Yeltsin argued that any expansion of NATO that did not include Russia 
would undermine European security.43 Warning against a possible unfavorable reaction 
of the Russian public opinion for an eventual NATO eastward expansion, he stated: 
{And generaJiy,] we favor a situation where the relations between our country and 
NATO would be by several degrees wanner than those between the Alliance and 
Eastern Europe. NATO-Russia rapprochement, including through their interaction 
in the peace-making area, should proceed on a faster track. The East Europeans, 
too, could be involved in this process. 44 
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has made it clear that Moscow opposes 
NATO membership for East-Central European countries. He also announced that 
"East-Central Europe has never ceased to be an area of interest for Russia".45 
41 ITAR-TASS, 25 August 1993. On Yeltsin' s visit to Poland see also The New York Times, 26 
August 1993: "Yeltsin ' Understands' Polish Bid for c1 Role in NATO" by Jane Perlez. 
~ 1 See The Guardian, 21 October 1993: "Back in the arms of Boris" by lon Traynor. 
41 Roger Cohen, "Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe", The New York 
Times, 2 October 1993. 
44 Copy of the letter received during interview in the Pentagon. 
4
" PAP, 24 August 1993. On Russian viewpoint see also RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, 
No.41, 15 October 1993: "Russian Views on an Eastward Expansion of NATO" by Suzanne Crow. 
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G. THE POLISH RATIONALE 
Initially, the Polish approach to the issue of eventual NATO membership was, in 
contrast to Hungarian initiatives, more cautious. On 19 February 1991, one year after the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister's suggestion of possible future NATO membership,46 the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw issued a statement announcing that Poland had no 
intention of joining NATO. Yet, merely one week later the Polish Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee stated that Poland should seek to expand its links with the Western alliance. 
Four months later, during his visit to Brussels headquarters, President Walesa 
confirmed Poland's intention to expand its relations with NAT0.47 In the face of rising 
fears of provoking Moscow, he clearly addressed the Polish view concerning its Eastern 
neighbor: 
In our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union we emphasize elements that link us 
together. We are working hard to have genuine friends on our Eastern border. I am 
convinced that it is in our general interest. We are not interested in the isolation of 
the Soviet Union. Just the reverse. We are virtually interested in its becoming an 
integral part of the New Europe. Without USSR participation it is impossible to 
have a lasting solution to the issue of peace and security on our continent.411 
(Emphasis added) 
This emphasis on trying not to antagonize the Soviet Union (and then Russia) has 
been characteristic of the Polish policy toward a possible NATO membership. In his 





"President Walesa visits NATO headquarters", NATO Review, No.4 (August) 1991, p.35. 
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Onyszkiewicz emphasized that Poland was not seriously threatened and should not 
provoke Russia and Ukraine by feverish seeking NATO membership: 
These loud appeals for us to join NATO are foolish, amateurish and 
counterproductive. NATO has made it quite clear that it is not even considering 
extending its membership. There are good reasons for this and they should be 
enough for us. It is stupid and below a certain level of dignity to kick at a door that 
is firmly closed. 49 
Talking about increasing NATO's commitments which would eventually lead to the 
integration of East-Central European countries with the Western alliance, the then Polish 
Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka also emphasized that: "Good relations with all 
surrounding countries are among the top priorities of Polish foreign policy". so 
In spite of different speculation following the electoral victory of left-wing parties 
in September 1993, the present government respects the chairman of the victorious Social 
Democracy of the Republic of Poland (and now also Vice-Premier) Aleksander 
Kwasniewski's pre-electoral programmatic declaration stating the immutable character of 
the Polish policy toward a possible membership in NATO: "We would continue the 
present government's drive for membership of NATO and the European Community-- 'A 
question ofto be or not to be for Poland''. 51 
After Yeltsin's U-turn on his policy toward NATO enlargement,52 the Polish side 
adjusted its argumentation on the possible membership in the Western Pact. A good 
~" Nicholas Bethell, "Much ado about plots", The Observer, 16 August 1992. 
-.n Hanna Suchocka (Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland), "Poland' s European 
perspective", NATO Review, No.3 (June) 1993, p.4 . 
.,, The Observer, 15 September 1993. 
'il Seep. 29. 
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example of such "modified rationale" can be the former Defense Minister Janusz 
Onyszkiewicz's explanation of the East-Central European countries' primary motivation 
to join NATO: 
It's not to defend against a Russian attack. We see that as a virtual impossibility. 
The key reason we want to be in NATO is to secure our own democracies. We need 
to keep down in our countries the very same kind of nationalists Yeltsin's 
contending with, the same kind that have destroyed Yugoslavia. 53 (Emphasis added) 
Indeed, although Poland has been the only post-communist country without internal 
disturbances (mainly ethnic), an eventual membership in NATO would obviously 
strengthen the elites who support democracy and capitalism. 
The above argument is one of the two main premises of the Polish quest for NATO 
membership. The secoo" premise is a fear of re-born Russian nationalism and its possible 
cor "!nces: "(The Wes< · .JO optimistic about Russia, and is playing into Russia's 
hau·J~ ••y not seeing the signals of imperial thinking",54 said the Polish Foreign Minister 
Andrzej Olechowski. During his visit to Washington in December 1993, Minister 
Olechowski tried to seek not for a specific date of Poland's membership in NATO, but 
rather for a "concrete perspective". He asked: "I need a road map -- that the end of road is 
NAT0". 55 The answer was -- the Partnership for Peace. Talking about the Poland's 
reaction to this controversial American initiative (some critics dubbed it the "eternal 
holding room"), Olechowski stated in Washington in January 1994: 
.,, Michael Kramer, "The Case for a Bigger NATO", Time, 10 January 1994. 




The Polish government has recently accepted the basic tenets of the US-sponsored 
and NATO-proposed Partnership .for Peace. P.fP quite clearly increases our 
security. It confirms the US commitment to Europe which, in our view, is a sine 
qua non of the continent's security and stability. It opens the Alliance to the East 
and thus makes our hopes to join the Western security structures more achievable.s<> 
H. THE GERMAN STANDPOINT 
Two Western countries are especially important for Poland: the United States, as 
the leader of the Western world, and the Federal Republic of Germany, as the dominant 
state in Western Europe and one with special interests in Poland. Because Germany 
borders on Poland and the Czech Republic, is obviously interested in expanding and 
strengthening its relations ,lith the countries of East-Central Europe. The relations with 
Poland, mainly because of Poland's geo-strategic position but also because of the 
common tragic past, play a particular role in this process. 
The main German concern is to maintain a stability and security in its neighboring 
countries. Following the symptomatic Konrad Adenauer's statement: "Only the awareness 
that the freedom of the Europe cannot be divided will give the vision of Europe the 
necessary impetus", Germany tries to prevent a potentially dangerous security vacuum in 
East-Central Europe. Because of this, the German standpoint on the issue of NATO 
enlargement has been the most favorable among Western countries. German Defence 
Minister Volker Rube, in particular, has always played a supportive role in the Visegrad 
countries' attempts to join NATO: 
'·" Text of the address received from the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, 
D.C.,p.l. 
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I cannot see one good reason for denying future members of the European Union 
membership in NATO. The Atlantic Alliance must not become a 'closed shop'. [ ... ] 
Our aim must be to fill the security policy vacuum to the East of NATO and to 
enhance stability throughout the region.57 
Although, by the time of the announcement of the Partnership for Peace, Bonn 
officials dutifully became more cautious, Germany remains the main ally for the 
East-Central European countries seeking for NATO membership. Commenting on this 
American initiative, Mr.Ruhe explained the German rationale: "If we do not export 
stability, we will import instability". 58 
'•
7 Volker Ruhe, "Europe and the Alliance: key factors for peace and stability", NATO Review, 
No.3 (June) 1993, p.15. 




IV. THE POLITICS OF US POLICYMAKING 
A. US ROLE IN THE POST-COLD WAR NATO 
Despite the end of Cold War, NATO has remained a key issue for the United 
States, in the context of their relations with Europe. The Atlantic Alliance still provides 
the most direct channel to inject US interests into European policymaking: 
Despite the waning of the cold war, the United States has major political and 
economic interests in Europe. The US role in NATO gives us significant indirect 
leverage in addressing such issues as the Persian Gulf crisis and trade disputes. 
Without a military presence, we would have no voice in Europe. 59 
Indeed, the Bush Administration as well as the Clinton Administration have 
emphasized a broad US consensus that the United States must remain a European power. 
In this context, an "informal" leadership in NATO remains a vital US interest. 
In 1991, the United States opposed the French desire to gradually diminish NATO's 
role in the defense of Europe. Declaring the US "full support" for the concept of 
European integration, former Secretary of State James A. Baker emphasized: 
It is clear to us that one of our key goals must be to insure that NATO remains the 
principle venue for our consultations and the forum for agreement on all policies 
bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members. 60 
~,, Richard Nixon, ••1s America a Part of Europe? .. , National Review, March 2, 1992, p .. 26. 
'~' See The New York Times, June 7, 1991: "NATO Tries to Ease Security Concerns in Eastern 
Europe" by Thomas L. Friedman. 
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The present Administration has also declared its deep concern in European security 
and NATO, which plays the most significant role with this respect. On the eve of the 
NATO summit in January this year, in his address about American foreign policy, 
President Clinton told a group of young people in Brussels: 
The core of our security remains with Europe. That is why America's commitment 
to Europe's safety and stability remains as strong as ever. That is why I urged 
NATO to convene this week's summit. It is why I am committed to keeping 
roughly l 00,000 American troops stationed in Europe, consistent with the 
expressed desires of our allies here. It is not habit, but security and partnership that 
justifies this continuing commitment by the United States. [ ... ) Only NATO has the 
military forces. the integrated command, the broad legitimacy and the habits of 
t:ooperation that are essential to draw in new participants and respond to new 
challenges. M (Emphasis added) 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF US VIEWPOINT ON NATO ENLARGEMENT 
Although at the very beginning United States policy toward NATO enlargement 
was rather skeptical [Ref. 4], some American officials have perceived the significance of 
NATO's possible role in strengthening stability and security in Eastern Europe. The US 
Ambassador to NATO, William H. Taft stated in July 1991 that : 
[NATO is a security anchor in Western Europe] so that Eastern Europe can develop 
its potential with the least threat of instability disorder and intimidation. NATO 
cannot guarantee Eastern European stability, bui its absence would be destabilizing 
in the extreme.62 
"' See The New York Times, January 10, 1994: "Clinton in Europe: A Continent' s Security 
Blanket?". 





The abortive August 1991 military coup in Moscow appeared to be a turning-point 
that prompted the United States to consider a possibility of eventual security guarantees 
for East European countries. Such future guarantees were to be granted through the 
medium ofNATO: 
In the longer term, NATO should develop formal security links with Eastern 
European democracies. Our goal should be their full integration into NATO. We 
will never build a common transatlantic home if NATO forces Eastern Europeans 
to live outside its protective wall. 63 (Emphasis added) 
The Bush Administration, generally favorable to a future NATO expansion to 
East-Central Europe, considered two elements: first, when East-Central Europeans would 
be ready for membership, second, what effect on Russia it would have [Ref. 7]. This 
peculiar "Russian syndrome" has always played a significant role in the context of an 
eventual NATO enlargement. However, for the Pentagon such an aspect has been less 
important than for other US institutions responsible for national security [Ref.l4]: 
Having defended its cold war borders so successfully, NATO needs to look East 
and extend Europe's security environment in response to the shift of political 
gravity on the continent. It is now logical for NATO to strengthen stability and 
security beyond its borders, to those states which are rapidly expanding relations 
with NATO allies in the political and economic arenas. By bringing in the East, 
NATO offers the opportunity for a broader European security, and serves as a 
catalyst for fostering democratic values across the continent. This is the best 
possible protection of the peace we have won. 64 (Emphasis added) 
"
1 Richard Nixon, "Is America a Part of Europe?", National Review, March 2, 1992, p.28. 
b4 James P. McCarthy, Deputy Commander in Chief, US European Command: "Opportunities 
for Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe", Vita/Speeches of the Day, November 15, 
1992, p.67. 
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By the end of 1992, former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that the 
Visegrad countries should eventually become NATO members, and the US officials told 
the then visiting Polish Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz that Washington 
supported Poland's bid to join NA T0.65 When asked about the current US policy toward a 
possible NATO enlargement, the senior Pentagon official of the previous Administration 
said: "I would be more forthcoming" [Ref.7]. 
The presidential election of 1992 postponed a debate on the question of NATO 
enlargement for the next few months. 
C. THE MUTABLE CHARACTER OF CURRENT US FOREIGN POLICY 
Countries that have been seeking for NATO membership and have tried to gain the 
United States support in this respect find the current Washington political environment 
difficult. After the end of Cold War, US foreign policy has been in the time of transition, 
"much more so than foreign policies of other Western countries" a senior Administration 
official said.66 After the fall of communism, President Bush introduced the notion of 
"New World Order" but did not have enough time to precisely defme it. The new 
President won the election based on his ambitious domestic agenda, which has focused 
on economic as well as social problems. In the election of 1992, foreign policy was not a 
controversial issue. However, acording to interviews with a senior Administration 
"" See RFEIRL Research Report, Vol.2, No.28, July 9, 1993: "Central and Eastern Europe's 
Quest for NATO Membership" by Alfred A. Reisch, p.43. 
'* He also added: "We don' t have fixed views, our institutions are trying to adjust their roles to 
new challenges". 
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official, the White House has generally focused on domestic affairs but "almost out of 
necessity" has payed increasing attention to foreign policy issues (particularly Russia, 
NAFTA, GATT, and Japan). 
From the very beginning, the Clinton Administration has been preoccupied with 
domestic issues, according to its motto: "We recognize that only an America that is 
strong at home can act as an effective partner abroad".67 With regard to foreign policy, 
President Clinton has identified three pillars upon which US "total diplomacy"68 must 
rest: 
First, elevating global economic growth as a primary foreign policy goal; Second, 
updating [our] forces and security arrangements to meet new threats, and; Third, 
organizing [our] foreign policy to help promote the spread of democracy and free 
markets abroad. 69 
Indeed, the economic factor seems to be the most essential aspect of current 
American foreign policy. Such a tendency, according to the senior Administration 
official, is well illustrated by the character of the United States assistance for Russia. 
"While the Bush Administration supported Gorbachev for stability and used the notion of 
security architecture," he said, " the Clinton Administration supports Yeltsin to expand 
r~forms, and shows less attachment to the old structure, having no idea how a new 
structure should look like". However, the both Administrations have emphasized that for 
''
7 Warren Christopher, Secretary of State: "NATO and US Foreign Policy", US Department of 
State Dispatch, Vol.4, No.9, March 1, 1993, p.1 19. 
•o~~ Ibid, The notion of "total diplomacy" as a diplomacy that views domestic and foreign issues 
as inseparable, was introduced by Dean Acheson (Secretary of State, 1 949-52). 
"'' Ibid. 
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Europe, unlike for Asia, the model of reforms should include two factors: democracy and 
tree market reforms. 
In his first address to the North Atlantic Council in February 1993, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher emphasized the significance of economic factor for US foreign 
policy: 
The states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, need our 
tlelp. These countries are trying to develop into free market democracies. Assisting 
them i.~ not charity; it is essential to our common security. 10 (Emphasis added) 
How does this economic emphasis affect US policy on NATO expansion? A senior 
Pentagon official, talking about US rationale toward NATO enlargement, said "economy 
is the main factor". 71 But a second issue is also critical: that of the negative response of 
Russia to NATO expansion, and the emphasis by some (but not all) US policymakers on 
the need to avoid antagonizing Y eltsin and his rivals. When asked about the "Russian 
syndrome", the same official replied: "It's not a driver, but it's very important factor." It is 
understandable that a powerful and poHtically unstable Russia has remained the major 
challenge for the United States. In a recent article, suggestively entitled Don't Threaten 
Us, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote: 
( ... ]pragmatic politicians in Russia and the West have proceeded on two premises. 
First, Russia is destined to be a great power, not a junior one. Under Communist or 
nationalist regimes, it would be an aggressive and threatening power, while under 
democratic rule it would be peaceful and prosperous. But in either case it would be 
a great power. Second, partnerships like ours cannot negate a firm, even 
aggressive, policy of defending one's own national interests. Although this may 
711 Ibid, p.120. 
'' He commented: "It would be better for Poland to become, first of all, a member of European 
Union", but he added "it's also more difficult". 
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result in occasional disputes, the context must remain one of compromise rather 
than confrontation. How naive to expect powers as great as Russia and the US 
always to be in harmony.12 (Emphasis added) 
Moreover, Russia still remains the only power capable of destroying America by a 
nuclear strike. This potential threat is essential, especially from the military point of view: 
"Bosnia and Iraq may be important, but the real security [of the Atlantic Alliance] will be 
determined by what happens in Russia. "7~ 
The Administration's Russia strategists, headed by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott, have been preoccupied with the need to promote progress toward a democratic, 
economically revitalized Russia. 74 In this context, the US-sponsored and 
NATO-proposed Partnership for Peace initiative is considered by its critics as a recipe to 
keep the Russians happy and the East Europeans hoping. 
D. CREATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE 
I. Latent "Isolationist" Temptation? 
The Clinton Administration has perceived a need for adjusting US forces and 
security arrangements to the new, post-Cold War reality. Talking about a new role for 
NATO, Secretary Christopher declared: 
71 Andrei Kozyrev, "Don' t Threaten Us", The New York Times, March 18, 1994, p.A 11. 
7
' Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, the then NATO's Supreme Commander and Chief of US Forces 
in Europe: "NATO Commander Says Gls Feel Strain of Drawdown" by William Drozdiak, The 
Washington Post, March 28, 1993. 
74 In East-Central European countries that have a long and complicated history of their 
relations with neighboring Russia, there is an opinion that experts at Russia can generally be divided 
into two categories: First, experts at Russia's literature, and second, experts at Russia's history. 
While the first group tends to look at Russian affairs from the perspective of great Russia' s culture, 
the second group simply analyzes lessons from Russia' s past (even very recent, though). 
41 
We must also continue our efforts to develop cooperative security arrangements 
with the nations of the fonner Warsaw Pact. By enhancing their security. we 
rei~force our own. There can be no better way to establish a new and secure Europe 
than to have soldiers from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, and the other new 
democracies work with NATO to address their most pressing security problems.75 
(Emphasis added) 
As the senior Administration official observed, there is "sympathy for a concept of 
new European security system" within US Government. With regard to NATO 
enlargement, however, a conflict has still existed between a will to help (particularly the 
Visegrad countries) and a fear of undesirable effect in two aspects: practical (pragmatic) 
as well as Russian [Ref.l4].76 
Another negative factor has been a belief that Congress would not approve a new 
foreign security commitment (i.e. security guarantees for eventual new NATO members). 
Indeed, "a lot oflaw-makers are reluctant to deal with [the issue of NATO enlargement], 
because they are afraid of public opinion" [Ref. I 0]. Not only State Department, but also 
some NATO members (e.g. Great Britain) tend to hide behind the US Congress 
unwillingness [Ref.l4]. However, support for NATO expansion has emerged from the 
growing belief that the NATO-established North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(December 1991 ), a forum for consultations with East European countries (a consultative 
process without structure and staft), has not proved to be satisfactory. Simon Lunn, 
7
" Warren Christopher, Secretary of State: ''NATO and US foreign Policy", US Department of 
State Dispatch, Vol.4, No.9, March 1, 1993, p.120. 
71
' Opponents of NATO expansion to East-Central European countries, have been raising two 
negative possible results of an eventual admission: 1. expanding number of NATO members would 
make even more difficult to reach consensus ("consensus building is a fundamental part of NATO" 
1Ref.15l>-- not to create a second CSCE (the strongest proponents of this factor are Brits); 2. 'Russian 
syndrome" -- not giving arguments for Russian nationalists. 
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deputy secretary general ofthe North Atlantic Assembly, NATO's link with legislators of 
member states, observed: 
[The NACC] is too broad, too diluted to meet the concerns of Eastern states that 
want to escape from Russia's shadow. They still feel they have been left on the 
outside, and they want to become full members ofthe club.77 
2. Creative Role of the Pentagon 
During a first few months of 1993, the issue of NATO enlargement remained in 
a deadlock. However, the Pentagon, which realized that US government was not willing 
to expand NATO in the near future, began to cor.sider an alternative solution. The main 
creativity came from the Bureau of Regional Security Affairs headed by Charles 
Freeman, Assistant Secretary of Defense. His proposal reflected a combination of two 
potentially conflicting objectives: "to give membership and not to create a new line of 
division in Europe," said senior Pentagon official directly involved in this process. There 
was also emphasis that eventual new NATO's members should be contributors, not only 
consumers, of security. Initially, the idea of "associate membership" in NATO was 
considered. Although such an arrangement would not provide explicit security guarantees 
under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, it would give the clear prospect of future 
membership and provide time for 'associate members' to adapt their armed forces to meet 
NATO standards. In May 1993, however, because of unwillingness to create different 
categories of candidates, the Pentagon working-team gave up the idea of associate 
membership. 
77 See The Washington Post, September 1, 1993: "NATO Balks At Opening Pact To E.Europe" 
by William Drozdiak. 
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According to the senior Pentagon official, "by July we had written what was 
actually the [future] Partnershipfor Peace". That draft of proposal emphasized, first of 
all, the need to avoid new divisions in European security system and to create a chance 
for future NATO membership. Although the proposal designed by the Bureau of 
Regional Security Affairs did not contain precise obligations to be fulfilled by 
candidate-states, it pointed out that such requirements like democratic civilian control 
over armed forces, transparency of defense budgets, compatible (with NATO standards) 
force structure, common military exercises and interoperability, arms standardization, 
would be the essential factors in the context of an eventual NATO membership. These 
requirements were summarized by the Bureau's head Mr. Freeman (and then restated by 
Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski): 
(We understand that] Partnership for Peace is to make you look and walk and 
quack like a duck. Once you've done this, and eventually arrived at the situation 
where you do walk and quack like a duck, then other ducks should say 'Yes, you 
are a duck, so we accept you'. 711 
3. "Vox populi" 
Although the question of NATO enlargement has been considered politically 
"inconvenient," because of executive branch fears that such enlargement would be 
unpopular with Congress and US voters, East-Central European countries have received 
a significant support in their campaign to join the Western alliance from Sen. Richard G. 
Lugar of Indiana, "the most influential Republican voice on foreign policy". 79 Mr. Lugar, 
7
" See The Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 1994: "Eastern Europe Presses Its Case For 
Speedy NATO Membership" by Justin Burke . 
.,., See The Washington Post, September 6, 1993: "Open the Ranks To Eastern Europe" by 
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a member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence committees and co-chairman 
of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, appealed, in the context of calamitous 
European and American failure in the former Yugoslavia, for a "New NATO" that would 
assume responsibilities beyond its existing borders: 
The choice is not between the current NATO and a new NATO but rather between 
a new NATO or no NATO.[ ... ] NATO membership must be extended to eastern 
and central European countries. But who should be in, and when? Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic art' ..:urrently staunch Atlanticists; bringing them in would 
strengthen the alliance and ·western interests. While full membership could be 
attained incrementally, the current security problems suggest an acceleration of any 
timetable. But there is no reason why it must be simultaneous for the eastern and 
central European countries. There are good reasons for maintainir.g a flexible 
approach. Some countries such as Poland may be ready for NATO membership 
sooner than others; the reverse may be true for membership in European 
Community, where the Czech Republic may be ready for accession sooner than 
Poland.80 
During his visit to Warsaw in August 1993, Sen. Lugar declared: 
I'm in favor of associate membership of NATO for Poland right away. The Poles 
believe the orientation of the country is to the West in terms of the economy and 
militarily, and this is a logical and good time to do it."' 




"Time for a New NATO with a New Mission" (excerpts from a speech by US Sen. Richard 
G. Lugar), Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 30, 1993, p.66. 
"' See The New York Times, August 26, 1993: " Yeltsin ' Understands' Polish Bid for a Role in 
NATO" by Jane Perlez. 
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4. Decisive Role of the State Department 
The second institution responsible for formulating national security policy, the 
Department of State, remained passive with regard to the issue of NATO enlargement 
until late summer, 1993. In August, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that 
NATO expansion "is not now on the agenda".82 Soon after, a working-team responsible 
for preparation for NATO summit was created. According to the senior Administration 
official, that team was "to give President something optimistic to say [during the 
summit], to move things step forward". A significant number of senior State Department 
officials were favorable to the idea of conditional (incremental) NATO membership for 
East-Central European countries. 
President Yeltsin's letter fron. September 1993, appeared to be a good argument for 
opponents as well as for adherents of the idea of NATr: enlargement. "This is a normal 
art l~l use in bureaucracy," a State Department official said, "while some treated the letter 
as a confirmation of their fear of possible Russia's reaction, others argued that Russia 
could not be given the privilege of vetoing NATO expansion". 
Reportedly under influence of the letter, Strobe Talbott, the then Ambassador at 
Large to the countries of former Soviet Union, wrote a confidential memorandum for 
President and Secretary of State. 83 In his memo, the Administration's chief Russia 
strategist a;gued that an eventual NATO eastward expansion would be perceived in 
111 See The Washington Post, October 5, 1993: "East European Bids To Join NATO Soon Seen 
in Jeopardy" by William Drozdiak. 
111 See Rzeczpospolita, 29-30 January 1994: "A Man, Who Stopped NATO. Strobe Talbott and 
his doctrine" by Sylwester Walczak (New York). 
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Russia as a move against her and would significantly impede Russian reforms. During a 
consultation held in Department of State on October 18, 1993, Mr. Talbott persuaded 
Secretary Christopher of his rationale, and soon after he also convinced President Clinton. 
In a deadlock created by Mr. Talbott's intervention, Gen. Shalikashvili, the 
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, took the lead and presented the proposal designed in 
the Pentagon. On October 20, 1993, during a meeting of NATO defence ministers in 
Travemuende (Germany), the United States announced an idea to offer limited military 
"partnership" to any European country interested in NATO membership. Such an idea, 
called Partnership for Peace, was to be formally proposed by President Clinton at the 
NATO summit meeting in January 1994. 
E. EMERGENCE OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE- REMARKS 
From the practical point of view, the Partnership for Peace (called P4P in 
East-Central Europe ) is just a multilateral version of hitherto prevailing bilateral 
cooperation between NATO and respective East European countries. US creators of P4P 
combined (and proposed further extension) existing bilateral relations, "partly because 
they were good, but also because they helped to avoid NATO enlargement" according to 
the senior Administration official, into an uniform NATO proposal. 
As the then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin told the Atlantic Council of the United 
States in December 1993: 
It's important to note that there are two things partnership would not provide: the 
NATO security guarantee and automatic membership at some future time. First, the 
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security guarantee. Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty requires each member 
to regard an attack on one as an attack on all. The Article Five guarantee would not 
he extended to partners. The next big question, of course, is whether joining the 
partnership ts a ticket into NATO. It is not. Partners for peace would not 
automatically become eligible for membership in NATO. They don't even have to 
want to join NAT0.84 (Emphasis added) 
Although P4P can undoubtedly be considered as a step forward in the context of 
NATO enlargement, its "loose" formula is symptomatic of its conflicting goals. As a 
senior US diplomat laconically observed: 
The Partnership for Peace proposal was a very skillful compromise between 
people who said we should do nothing to offend the Russians and people who said 
we should let the Eastern Europeans in now. [ ... ] The beauty of the proposal is that 
it~~ a .frame on whose canvas we can paint whatever we need. 85 (Emphasis added) 
Indeed, P4P is a "vehicle that faces two ways" the senior Administration official 
remarked, "it's very important for American political thinking". 
The creation of P4P is a good example of bargaining character of the US foreign 
policymaking process. This process is driven by the wide distribution of power, and the 
need for individuals and organizations with conflicting preferences to compromise with 
each other. The drive for agreement among competing actors determined the final 
solution to the conflict over NATO expansion. "Politics is the art of possible," one State 
Department official said in justifying the Partnership for Peace. And perhaps such 
compromises are all that can be expected in the immediate post-Cold War era, when US 
interests are subject to such widely differing interpretations within the Administration. 
114 les Aspin, 'NATO's Partners for Peace", Defense Issues, Vol.8, No.69, p.2. 
"~ See The New York Times, January 4, 1994: "NATO Plight: Coping With Applicants" by 
Craig R. Whitney. 
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indeed, considering the lack of an overarching, coherent doctrine for US foreign policy, 




A. THE NATURE OF THE US FOREIGN POLICYMAKING PROCESS 
The way in which the United States has dealt with the problem of NATO 
enlargement conflicts with the notion that domestic factors dominate decisionmaking on 
many foreign policy issues, especially where ethnic interests may be at stake. There are 
over ten million US voters of Polish descent. Yet, I found no evidence that ethnic 
lobbying groups played a significant role in dectsionmaking on the Partnership jor 
Peace. For example, the Polish American Congress conducted an all-out effort to protest 
against Administration policies on NATO expansion, resulting in some hundred 
thousands letters sent by its members to the White House. 116 But that lobbying did 
nothing to divert the Administration from its policy, and there are no signs that the 
political effectiveness of this lobbying toward the White House is on the rise. 
From the bureaucratic politics perspective, one important feature of US 
policymaking stands out in the case of NATO expansion: the fragmented nature of power 
in American government, and the way that the need for compromise drives the output of 
the policymaking process. However, this drive toward compromise was reinforced by the 
lack of a coherent, underlying agreement on post-Cold War US policy in Europe -- in 
particular, on the seemingly incompatible goals of strengthening Polish security and 
"'' On January 6, 1994, in Milwaukee, Vice-President AI Gore (replacing the absent President 
Clinton -- his mother' s funeral) met representatives of ethnic groups from East-Central Europe (this 
community consists of about 22 million Americans) to explain to them the Administration' s policy 
toward countries of that region. 
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avoiding conflict with Russia. The emergence of a wider consensus on the fundamentals 
of US policy would mute the bureaucratic infighting (and need for compromise) on more 
specific issues such as NATO expansion. 
The most significant divergence of this case from bureaucratic theory lies in the 
latter's emphasis on institutionally-driven preferences. In the case of NATO expansion, 
my interviews suggested that differences of opinion did not seem to reflect narrow 
institutional interests, and conflicts within institutions were at least as common as 
conflicts between institutions. But this lack of institutionally-based conflict has allowed 
a handful of individuals to press their own personal policy preferences. Indeed, Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has found surprisingly little resistance within the 
Administration to conducting his "Russia-first" policy.87 
Adherents of a quick NATO membership for East-Central European countries come 
mainly from outside the current Administration. Because of this, their direct influence on 
creating US foreign policy in this respect is significantly limited. However, using the 
media, they have attempted to shape public opinion and create a more favorable political 
climate for the NATO expansion issue. Sen. Richard Lugar has explicitly criticized the 
current line of US foreign policy: 
The Administration seemed to classify Western Europe as a vital interest while 
East-Central Europe and the Balkans were not. They appeared to be using a 
K? Interestingly enough, the current US foreign policy toward East-Central Europe is similar to 
that after World War I and WWII, which used to treat countries of the region (especially Poland) as 
an object rather than a subject in the interplay between the West and Russia. Now like then, the 
United States (and, generally, the West) seem to agree that East-Central European countries belong 
to Russia's "organic" security zone ("A chicken is not a bird and Poland is not abroad", says the 
Russian proverb). Accusations of a "new Yalta" are obviously exaggerated, but the general 
tendency is anxiously similar. Hopefully a result will be different. 
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definition of vital interests that was a function of geography and nuclear weapons. 
Their rhetoric was about democracy and shared values, but their policies did not 
necessarily reflect this. 88 
Nevertheless, the Administration has consequently resisted any domestic pressures 
to change its standpoint on NATO enlargement. The official United States policy toward 
NATO enlargement reflects a general unwillingness on the part of the West to expand its 
security alliance eastward. Unless members of Congress perceive greater political and 
policy incentives to increase the heat on the White House, and use the power of the purse 
or other instruments of power to force a policy change, the Administration will be able to 
persist in its preferred path of appeasing the Russians. 
B. LESSONS FOR POLAND 
As Poland continues to press for NATO membership, there are some lessons that 
can be learned from the way in which the United Stat,es dealt with the problem of NATO 
enlargement over the past four years. First, Poland should consequently continue 
developing multi-sided cooperation with the West, paying particular attention to its 
economic aspect. Many of my interview subjects stressed the importance of economic 
ties and other elements of cooperation in facilitating tighter security links. Closer ties 
with the European Union (EU) contribute to, and full membership would significantly 
accelerate, Poland's membership in the Western alliance. With Europe's fastest-growing 
economy in 1993 (at a real rate of 4%), Poland has already formally applied for EU 
1111 Sen. Richard Lugar: The Russians Are Tough Rivals, Not Partners, Remarks Prepared for 
Delivery to the American Spectator Washington Dinner Club Four Seasons Hotel, March 7, 1994. 
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membership. This would provide another means of creating support in Congress and also 
in the US business community. 
Another lesson -- and one already very familiar in Poland -- is that Poland's 
position in the West results directly from her position in the East. Given the 
preoccupation of key Clinton Administration officials with the need to avoid 
antagonizing Russia, the Polish government should make every effort to ensure that 
Russia understands that Polish membership in NATO would not pose a security threat. 
Moreover, Polish officials should work with Administration policymakers to investigate 
ways to meet Polish NATO objectives in a manner consistent with the evolution of larger 
Administration strategies on foreign policy (and with the need to encourage progress in 
Russia). During his visit to Washington in December 1993, Polish Foreign Minister 
Andrzej Olechowski stated: 
We do not want to create new lines in Europe. Rather, we want to overcome those 
which result from the cold war. We need fresh thinking on security and a genuine 
new quest for viable forms of cooperation, tuned to the aspirations and needs of 
individual states, however big or small. 89 
This approach seems extraordinarily promising, not just on substantive grounds but 
because of the nature of the US policymaking process. 
But prospects for near-term progress on Polish membership seem dim. American 
sensitivity to Russian concerns may strengthen the position of Russian nationalists and 
gives them an additional trump, by showing that the only world's super-power 
"" Text of the address received from the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, 
D.C. (p.ll ). 
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acknowledges their potential influence on official Russia's polic) Moreover, according to 
an opinion expressed by Russian military leaders, an eventual Polish membership in 
NATO "is not an issue of our security, but of our pride" [Ref.8). Such considerations 
could be difficult to overcome, but there are steps that can be taken to improve these 
prospects. 
The troublesome problem of NATO eastward expansion seems to confinn that, 
... there are indeed lessons to be learned from the Cold War, though not the same 
ones for the East and the West. ... from the East they require more wisdom, from 
the West more faith ... 90 
Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, Columbia University Press, 1979, p.313. 
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APPENDIX. NATO'S "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" 
NATO . 
PartnerJilip for peace 
OTAN 
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PRESS CCiiiOiilgu& 11-1194)2 FOr ~ate releaae to Ofanuarx itA 
... the Heada of State and Govea.ent of the ...tMtr 
c:owatdea of the Borth Atlantic Alliance, buUdiog on the cloae 
and longatudiDg partDerabip UOft9 the North AMdcaa and 
European Alliea, are ~tted to enbanciDg aeCU"ity and 
at&biUty in the wbole of £au-ope. lfe therefore viall to 
strenGthen tiea with the daOC:ratic atatu to wr .laat. .. 
reaffba tbat the Alliance, u p~ided for in Article 10 of the 
lfaahin9tOD 'J'reaty, r~ open to the ..-berahip of other 
European atatea in a poaition to further the principle• of the 
Treaty and to contribute to the aecurity of the Rorth Atlaatlc 
ar... We upect and would vel COM IIATO expaaalon tbat would 
reach to ~atic atatea to our Eaat, •• part of an 
evolutionary proceaa, takin9 into account political and security 
devel~tl in the whole of Europe. 
We bave today launched an u.ediate and practical 
progr.... that will tranafora the relationship bet~ IIA!O and 
participatincJ atatea. rhia aew ~ toe• beyoad dialoGue 
and cooperation to forge a real partnarabip - a PartDerahip for 
Peace. We therefore invite the other atatea parttcipat!Dg in tbe 
NACC ud otber CICB COUDtriea able and v1111119 to cootdbute to 
tbia progr-, to join with ua in this partnerabip. Active 
participation in tbe PartDerabip for Peace will play an lllportant 
role in tbe evolutionary procesa of the expanaion of RA!O. 
'J'he Partnerabip for Peace, which will operate under the 
authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new aecudty 
relationabipa betweu the Jlortb Atlantic Alliance and ita 
Partnera for Peace. Partner atates will be invited by tbe North 
Atlantic Council to participate in political and a111tary bodiea 
at JIA'l'O Headquarters with respect to Partnerahip activitie•· 'J'be 
Partnerabip will expand and intensify political and a111tary 
cooperation throughout Europe, increaae stability, diainiah 
threata to peace, and build strengthaned relationahipa by 
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pL'OIIOting the ~il'it of practical cooperation and =-ttllellt to 
daOcl'atlc Pl'iDCiplu. that _uadupiD .OUI' Alliaace. MAIO will 
couult with· uy actiYe putiotpeot in the ·Partou8hip if tbat 
pal'tner pai'Cehea a dil'ect t.bnat to ita terdtodal intql'ity, 
polit~cal ~. ol' HCUl'ity. ,lt a pace .ud. acope 
dete~ by tbe capacity aad deaire of the iDdiYidu&l 
participatillg atatea, we will work ill c:oocrete lilaya t:owuda 
tl'uapuelicy ill deface badiJetiDf, prc.otillg ct.Dciatic CODtrol 
of defence aiDJ.atl'iu, joillt plUiliDf, joint ailitary exei'Ciaea, 
ud crutillg u ability to operate with NATO forcu ill ncb 
fielda u peace~eepillg, aurcb ud reacue ud buuDituian 
operationa, and others as uy be qreed. 
To pra.ote cloaer ailitary cooperation and 
interoperability, we Will rropoae, within the Partunhip 
fruevork, peacekeepillg fiel exerciaea bqiDDlng ill llt4. To 
coordinate joint ~litary actlYitiea within tbe Partner8hip, we 
will invite atatea participating in the Partnerahip to aend 
pe~nent liaiaon officera to Mk!O HeadQuarter• and ' aeparate 
Partnership Coordination Cell at Ilona C&elvlua) that wcSW.d, under 
the authodty of the lfol'th Atlantic Council, cury out the 
ailitary planning neceaaary to ~leaent the Partnerabip 
progr.-s. 
Since iU inception two yean ago, the !forth Atlantic 
Cooperation council haa greatly expanded the depth and acope of 
ita actlYitiea. We will continue to work with all our IIACC 
partners to build cooperative relationship• aero•• the entire 
apectrua of the Alliance'• actiYitiea. With the expanaion of 
NACC activitlea and the establiaiiMnt of the Partnerahip for 
Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilitiea at NATO 
Headquarter& for peraonnel fro. NACC countriea and other 
Partnership for Peace participant• in order to lllprove our 








......... u ... niCS: ~ DCICO*''t :. . -
1. JWtJlu to tbe iJrdtatJ.aD extudecl by tbe D!O Beacb 
of State ud ~tat tbei~ ... tiDo OD lOtblllth o7uuary, 
1994, the ..-~aU atatea of tbe llo~ Atlutic . .AlliaDce aDd tbe 
otbu: atat .. nbacdbiag to Wa ~t, ~lftd to deepeD 
tbei~ political ud ail1tuy · u .. aDd to cootdbllte f~ to 
the atruttheaiat of aecurlty vith!J: ·the &UR-Atlutic u .. , 
hereby eatabliah, vithiD tbe f~....ork of the llorth Atlutic 
CooperatiOD COUDCU, thia Partnenbip for Peace. 
2. 'l'b11 Putaulhip 1a eatablilhilcl u u apruaion of a joint comictiOD that atability ud aecarity in the Earo-Atlutic 
area cu be achi....S ODly throu9h cooperation aDd c:-= action. 
Protection ud ~tion of fund...,tal freedau and hUUil 
righta, and eafecnaud1no of fr..S., juat1ce, ud pu;e throgp 
daocracy an abind valaea f•mctnental to the Partnetlhip. In joining the PutDUihip, the lllllbu Statel of the llozth Atlutic 
Alliuce and the other ltatea nblcrib!J:g to thia DocuMnt recall 
that they are ~tted to the preeenation of ~atic 
societiea, thei~ freedaa froa coercion and iatiaidatioo, ud the 
uintenuu:e of the principlea of 1nternat10Dal law. 'l'hey 
reaffina their ~t:MDt to fulfil in good faith the oblitatiODI 
of the Charter of the UDited Rationa aDd the principle• of the 
Univereal Declaratioa oa Bu.aa aightll epecifically, to refrain 
froa the threat or uae of force againat the territorial intevrtty 
or poli ~teal indepeDdeDc:e of any State, to re~ exiiUng 
bordera aad to Mttle diaputea by peaceful Mlftl. They alao 
reaffim their ~t:MDt to the Heleinlti Final Act and all 
subaequent CSCE docuaente and to the fulfil .. nt of the ~t­
aenta and obligaUona they have undertaken in the field of 
diaa~nt and •~ coatrol. 
3. The other atates subscribinci to this docuae~t will 
cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organizati,on in purauing 
the following obje~tives: 
(aJ facilitation of transparency in ~atioa.l defence 
pliDfting and budgeting processes; · 
. . ... 
(b) eneuring d..ocratic control of ~efenC:e f9rcea~ 
(c) uintuaace of the capability and ·readiness to con-
tribute, aubject to conatitutional.conaiderationa, to 
operations UDder the authority of the UN and/or the 
responaibility of tbe CSCE;· · , . .. 
(d) the develos-ent of cooperative military relations with 
NATO, for the JIUZ'POie of joint plannin9, trainin;, and 
exerciaea in ·order to atrengtben their ability to 
undertake miaeiona in the fielda of peacelteepiDCJ, 
aearcb and reacue, bullanitarian operatione, and other• 
as may aubsequently be agreed: 
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(e) ~~ :.dne'lorliiat,- emir: tlii. lODter tua, of forces that 
are better ele to operate with those of the llellbera 
of the Horth Atlantic All1uce. 
- -- 4. ·the .other aubacribiDCJ states will provide to . the MTO 
-Authorities .Preaeatatico ~ta identifying the at~ they 
- will take to adliwe tbe politi~l voala of tbe ~rabip and 
the· ailitary ancl other uaeta that aiCJht be uaed for l'artDerabip 
activities._ DTO will propoae a pr09r._. of partauabip 
exercises ancl other activities couistat witb tbe l'artaerabip's 
objectivu. Baaed oD tbia PZ'091'- and ita Presatation 
Doclaellt, eacb aubacribinCJ state will develop with !fArO an 
iDdividual PartDerahip Progr ..... 
. -S. In · preparing and: illplaentiDCJ their individual 
Partnerabip Pr091' .... s, otber subacribinCJ states aay, at their 
own expenae and in avreaent with the Alliance and, as necessary, 
relevant Belvian authorities, establish their own liaifon office 
with NATO Hea~artera 1D Bruaaela. This will facilitate their 
participation 1D NICC/Putnerabip .. etiDgs aad activities, as 
well as certain others by invitation. '!'hey will alao aake 
available peraODDel, assets, facilitiea and capabilitiea 
necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partaership 
PrOC)ru.e. HATO will usist thea, as appropriate, in foraulating 
and executing their individual Partnership Progr...es~ 
6. The other subscribing states accept the following 
underatandinvs: 
those vbo envisage participation in aiasions referred 
to in paragraph 3 (d) will, where appropriate, take 
part in related NATO exerciaea; 
they will fund their own participation in Partnership 
activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the 
burdens of 110unting exercises in which they take part; 
they aay send, after appropriate agreeaent, peraanent 
liaison officers to a separate PartDership 
Coordination Cell at Nona (Belqiua) that would, under 
the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out 
the ail1tary planning necessary· to iapleaent the 
Partnerahip progr .... a; 
those participating in planning and 11111 tary exercises 
will have access to certain NATO technical data 
relevant to inter-operability; 
buildinCJ upon the CSCE aeaaurea on defence planning, 
the other subacribing states and NATO cauntries will 
exchange infoxaation on the steps that have been taken 
or are beinq taken to proaote transparency in defenc~ 
planning and budgeting and to ensure the dea6crat1c 
control of araed forces; 
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tbey •Y participate in a nciprocal exc:bange of 
iDfUJ:UtiOD on defence planning and budgeting wbicb 
will be dneloped within the frauvork of the 
MICC/Partnerabip for Peace. 
7. In keeping with their COiaitaent to the objective• of 
tbia Partnerabip for Peace, the llabera of the North Atlantic 
Alliance villa 
deYelop with the other a~cribing atatea a planning 
and review proceaa to provide a baaia for identifying 
and evaluating forcea and capabllitiea that aJ.pt be 
•de available by th• for ault1nat1onal training, 
uerclaea, and operations in coojunctioo with Alliance 
forcea1 
pro.ote allitary and political coordination at HATO 
Beadqaartera in order to provide direction and guid-
ance relevant to Partnerahip activitiea vitla the other 
aabacribing atates, including planning, training, 
uereiaea and the develop.ent of doctrine. 
8. HlTO will conault with any active participant in the 
Partnerahip if tbat Partner perceive• a direct threat to ita 
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